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Logic has traditionally been construed as a normative discipline; it sets forth stand-
ards of correct reasoning. Explosion is a valid principle of classical logic. It states
that an inconsistent set of propositions entails any proposition whatsoever.
However, ordinary agents presumably do — occasionally, at least — have inconsist-
ent belief sets. Yet it is false that such agents may, let alone ought to, believe any
proposition they please. Therefore, our logic should not recognize explosion as a
logical law. Call this the ‘normative argument against explosion’. Arguments of this
type play — implicitly or explicitly — a central role in motivating paraconsistent
logics. Branden Fitelson (2008), in a throwaway remark, has conjectured that there
is no plausible ‘bridge principle’ articulating the normative link between logic and
reasoning capable of supporting such arguments. This paper offers a critical evalu-
ation of Fitelson’s conjecture, and hence of normative arguments for paraconsis-
tency and the conceptions of logic’s normative status on which they repose. It is
argued that Fitelson’s conjecture turns out to be correct: normative arguments for
paraconsistency probably fail.
1. Introduction
The hallmark of paraconsistent logics is their rejection of the rule of
explosion (henceforth EXP), or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet,
which states that an inconsistent set of premisses entails any propos-
ition whatsoever.1 EXP is standardly motivated with reference to the
classical conception of validity as necessary truth-preservation in
virtue of logical form: an argument departing from an inconsistent
set of premisses, we tell our bewildered students, can never fail to carry
the truth of the premisses over to the conclusion, because the pre-
misses, by dint of their inconsistency, can never be jointly true in the
first place. The paraconsistent logician rejects this line of argument
1 Paraconsistent logics so understood are a broad church. Our chief focus here is on the
philosophically better-known representatives of this family of logics: relevant logics in the
Anderson-Belnap tradition (Anderson and Belnap 1975) as well as Neil Tennant’s version
(Tennant 1997) and dialetheism (Priest 2006). On the other hand, many non-classical logics,
perhaps most notably intuitionistic logic, endorse EXP. For simplicity ’s sake, I will nevertheless
describe the dispute over the validity of EXP as a debate between two (not so mellifluously
named) parties: ‘paraconsistentists’ and ‘classicists’.
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along with the classical conception of validity that undergirds it. Her
misgivings about the classical view of validity are nicely summarized
by Graham Priest in the following:
[T]he notion of validity that comes out of the orthodox account is a
strangely perverse one according to which any rule whose conclusion is a
logical truth is valid and, conversely, any rule whose premisses contain
a contradiction is valid. By a process that does not fall short of
indoctrination most logicians have now had their sensibilities dulled to
these glaring anomalies. However, this is possible only because logicians
have also forgotten that logic is a normative subject: it is supposed to
provide an account of correct reasoning. When seen in this light the full
force of these absurdities can be appreciated. (Priest 1979, p. 297)
What particularly interests me here is the appeal to the normative
status of logic. Priest’s core criticism is that the classical conception
of consequence pays insufficient heed to logic’s essential role as a
standard for correct reasoning. Once we remind ourselves of logic’s
normative role in our cognitive economy, the ‘anomalous’ aspects of
classical logic — EXP, in particular — can be fully appreciated. In
adopting this normative perspective, we thus understand why, even
after years of classical indoctrination, many of us cannot shake the
feeling that there is something fishy about EXP.
But what does Priest mean when he describes logic as a ‘normative
subject’? As a first stab we might advance the following interpretation:
the normative connection between logic and thought consists in an
agent’s being committed to the logical consequences of her beliefs.
Following this suggestion, we can reconstruct what appears to be
the argument underpinning Priest’s criticism. In Robert Meyer’s po-
lemical formulation the argument comes down to this:
[I]t is an evident fact that (1) some people sometimes are committed to
some contradictory beliefs. And again, what else is logic for if it is not the
case that (2) a man committed to certain beliefs is committed as well to
their logical consequences? Friends, it is downright odd, silly and
ridiculous that on classical logical terrain (1) and (2) cannot be held
together, except on pain of maintaining that some people sometimes are
committed to absolutely everything. (Meyer 1971)
In short, the validity of EXP is irreconcilable with logic’s essential
normativity, provided we assume, as seems eminently reasonable,
that ordinary thinkers often (if not always) harbour inconsistent beliefs.
Let us refer to arguments that seek to establish the untenability of EXP
by showing its validity to be incompatible with the proper normative
role of logic, normative arguments against explosion (or normative
Mind, Vol. 0 . 0 . 2016  Steinberger 2016
2 Florian Steinberger
 by guest on M
arch 19, 2016
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
arguments for short). Arguments of this type, I think, have an undeni-
able appeal. The aim of this paper is to assess their prospects of success.
The plan is as follows. In the following section, I offer a more
careful formulation of the paradigmatic normative argument and
show why it must fail when formulated in this way. I then articulate
and refine Fitelson’s conjecture to the effect that there is no ‘bridge
principle’ — no way of precisifying the normative connection between
logic and our modes of belief formation, retention and revision — that
could salvage the normative argument. §3 addresses the assumption
that ordinary thinkers are (and, in certain circumstances, perhaps
should be) inconsistent believers. Drawing on and extending upon
MacFarlane (2004), §4 introduces a taxonomy of bridge principles
that will enable us to provide a systematic evaluation of Fitelson’s
conjecture. The evaluation is then carried out in §§5–7, where the
framework is put to good philosophical use: it is argued that there
is no successful way of reformulating the normative argument.
2. Normative arguments against EXP
The paraconsistent logician’s beef with EXP is not standardly pre-
sented as turning on questions of logic’s normativity. In the case of
relevant logic, for instance, the dispute usually takes the form of an all-
out disagreement about what the correct notion of validity should be.
The relevantist claims that it is plainly absurd to maintain that the
proposition that Mark Spitz is the current president of the United
States can be validly inferred from the contradictory propositions
that aardvarks are and are not indigenous to Africa. By contrast, the
classicist will insist that the inference is valid, because necessarily
truth-preserving. We thus find ourselves in a deadlock between two
competing intuitions about what follows from what, with no clear way
of adjudicating between them.2
2 There is another option for the paraconsistentist. She can agree with the classical logician
that validity is necessary truth-preservation, but maintain that propositions can be both true
and false. EXP would indeed turn out to be invalid on this assumption. For suppose P is both
true and false. That means that in the argument from P ^ ‰P to Q the premisses could be
true, while the conclusion might not be. But on what grounds are we to believe that prop-
ositions can be simultaneously true and false? There are two ways of arguing for this thesis.
The first is straight metaphysical dialetheism as advocated by Priest; the second is Nuel
Belnap’s interpretation of the truth-values in a four-valued logic as ‘told-true’ and ‘told-
false’ (Belnap 1977). See also Lewis (1982). Here is not the place to discuss these proposals.
I suspect, however, that neither of these options is particularly attractive to many
paraconsistentists.
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However, what arguably makes for the appeal of many paraconsis-
tentist approaches are not certain intuitions about the concept of
validity but the ‘intuitions about good reasoning’ (MacFarlane 2004,
p. 3) that underwrite them — intuitions that EXP-validating concep-
tions violate. Some advocates of paraconsistent logics like Meyer and
Priest explicitly found their arguments on these intuitions.3 But even
in the case of those arguments for paraconsistency based on the unin-
tuitive consequences of the classical notion of validity — arguments
from the ‘fallacies’ or ‘paradoxes’ of material implication — that do
not explicitly appeal to the normative status of logic, it seems that it is
the intuitions about correct reasoning that do the heavy lifting.4 For it
is only when we assume that logic is in the business of providing a
standard for correct reasoning that the arguments from the fallacies
have the drawing power they do. To see this, suppose with Gilbert
Harman that ‘there is no clearly significant way in which logic is
specially relevant to reasoning’ (Harman 1986, p. 20) and assume
that logic’s aim resides wholly in making an inventory of the argument
schemata we deem valid. Viewed from this perspective, it is hard to see
how the classical conception of validity could be faulted. Absent our
intuitions about correct reasoning, what is the standard that classical
validity is supposed to deviate from?
It is for this reason that Harman suggests that the case for relevant
logic dries up once we realize that there is no normative link between
logic and reasoning of the sort the relevant logician imagines. And it is
for this same reason that MacFarlane believes that our only hope of
transcending the stale, intuition-mongering debates between paracon-
sistentists and their adversaries over the correct notion of validity is by
transposing ‘questions about logical validity into questions how we
ought to think’ (MacFarlane 2004, p. 3).5
Does it follow from this that the case for paraconsistent logic stands
and falls with the normative argument against explosion? Of course
not. I have already pointed out alternative arguments for paraconsis-
tency in note 2 above, and there are others besides. Nevertheless, if the
3 Very similar points are made by Anderson and Belnap (1975, p. 13).
4 See Mares (2004, p. 3) and Read (1988, p. 24) for two examples of arguments of this type.
5 The claim here is not that there are no arguments for paraconsistency that do not
explicitly rely on substantive assumptions about the normativity of logic, but rather that
such assumptions are implicit in, and in fact central to, such arguments. Paraconsistent
logics would not have the following they do could they not rely on the underlying assumptions
concerning logic and its role in capturing our intuitions about good reasoning.
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normative argument fails, as I believe it does, this would be a result of
some moment; it would block the most direct — and arguably the
most natural and well-trodden — route to paraconsistency.6
Moreover, our investigations offer a case study, which, I hope, will
shed light on alternative, normativity-based arguments for paracon-
sistency, and on the role that considerations pertaining to the norma-
tivity of logic can play in arguments for non-classical logical revisions
more generally.
To get started, let us consider one way — a rather flat-footed way,
as we will see — of spelling out the normative argument more
carefully:7
(1) EXP is valid.
(2) S believes each member of an inconsistent set of propositions
F.
(3) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the Pi, S ought to believe
Q.
(4) Even if S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition
Q whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of EXP), there are Qs
such that S ought not to believe Q.
(5) F  Q for some patently unacceptable Q that S ought not to
believe (from 1 and 2).
(6) S ought not to believe Q (from 4).
(7) S ought to believe Q (from 2, 3 and 5 via modus ponens).
(8) Contradiction (from 6 and 7).
(9) EXP is invalid (from 1 by reductio).
Note that the phrase ‘S ought not to believe Q’ in 4 is to be understood
as ‘S ought to refrain from believing Q’ (which is equivalent to the
claim that it is not permissible for S to believe Q), as opposed to ‘It is
6 Notice that standard arguments from the utility of inconsistent but non-trivial theories
also fall into the category of normative arguments. The reason we regard such theories as non-
trivial is because the practitioners, mindful of the normative authority of logic over their
reasoning, are thought tacitly to operate on the basis of paraconsistent principles. See, for
instance, Priest, Tanaka and Weber (2013).
7 The formulation is inspired by Fitelson (2008).
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not the case that S ought to believe Q’ (which is compatible with it
being permissible for S to believe Q).8
What can be said about the normative argument thus spelled out?
Well, it is undoubtedly valid. But the question is how effective it is.
Not very effective at all, it would seem. The form of the argument is
that of an instance of the rule of negation-introduction or reductio.9
As Fitelson observes, its ineffectiveness stems from the fact that the
normative argument can easily be deflected by shifting the blame away
from EXP and instead identifying premiss 3 as the culprit in the in-
consistent set formed by premisses 1–4. Premiss 3 acts, in MacFarlane’s
apt terminology (2004), as a ‘bridge principle’ linking the logical con-
cept of entailment and the epistemological concepts of inference and
belief. As such, it encapsulates the paraconsistentist’s assumption re-
garding the existence of a tight normative connection between in-
stances of the relation of logical consequence and our agent’s
attitudes vis-a`-vis the propositions that stand in the specified logical
relations. Fitelson’s claim is that it, rather than our principle EXP, is at
fault: in light of the inconsistency of premisses 1–4, we ought to jet-
tison the simplistic bridge principle along with the erroneous concep-
tion of logic’s normative status that underlies it, not EXP and our
time-honoured classical notion of logical consequence.
Fitelson’s attack on premiss 3 is justified, I believe. The claim can be
substantiated by two simple objections. The first is familiar from
Gilbert Harman’s work (e.g. Harman 1984, p. 107). Hence:
Harman’s objection: Suppose I believe both P and P  Q (and that I
am aware of the entailment P, P  Q  Q). It simply does not follow
that I may believe Q, let alone that I ought to believe Q as 3 requires. Q
may be absurd, or at least discounted by my evidence, in which case the
rational course of action for me is not to comply blindly with modus
ponens and so form the belief Q, but rather to abandon at least one of my
antecedent beliefs, P and P  Q, in light of their unpalatable
consequences.
The second argument is, I think, equally simple and equally effective.
It is due to John Broome (2000, p. 85). Hence:
Broome’s objection: Suppose I find myself believing P. Since P  P (for
any P), premiss 3 entails that I ought to believe P. But that seems patently
false. After all, I find myself believing all sorts of things; P may have been
8 The deontic modals invoked here will be clarified further in §3.
9 Not to be confused with the intuitionistically impermissible rule of classical reductio:
G,‰P ‘ ?; G ‘ P.
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acquired in a doxastically irresponsible way. Surely, then, the mere fact that
by happenstance I believe P does not in general imply that I ought to, or
even that I may, believe P.
I take these objections to tell decisively against the proposed bridge
principle encapsulated in premiss 3.
At this stage the paraconsistentist will rightly complain that our
reconstruction of the normative argument has been uncharitable.
Little wonder that the argument (as we have presented it) holds no
water: we saddled the paraconsistent logician with a patently false
bridge principle! To give the normative argument a fair shake we
must replace premiss 3 with a viable one. However, it is not enough
for a substitute of premiss 3 to be viable; it must also be logically strong
enough to support the normative argument. That is to say, in order for
the reductio to go through it must generate an inconsistent set with the
remaining premisses 1, 2 and 4. To emphasize: any candidate bridge
principle the paraconsistentist might propose in lieu of 3 must satisfy
the following two desiderata.
Plausibility: Any candidate bridge principle must be philosophically
defensible.
Strength: Any candidate bridge principle must be sufficiently strong to
ensure the argument’s validity.
Now of course evaluating the plausibility of bridge principles is no
simple feat. Conformity with the criterion of plausibility will presum-
ably be a matter of degree, which will, in turn, be determined on a
cost-benefit basis by assessing bridge principles against a range of
desiderata.10 For most purposes, though, a weaker notion will serve
fine. To this end, let us simply say that a candidate bridge principle
qualifies as minimally plausible just in case it is immune to
both Harman’s and Broome’s objections. Minimal plausibility is
enough, it turns out, to dismiss a number of bridge principles out
of hand.
Thus, the question we now face is whether a replacement bridge
principle is to be had that satisfies both Plausibility and Strength.
Premiss 3 was strong enough, but failed to meet even the requirement
of minimal plausibility. Fitelson is of course fully aware that premiss 3
is but a ‘straw man’ bridge principle. The implausibility of premiss 3
10 The five criteria suggested by MacFarlane (2004, p. 11) would at least seem to offer a
starting point.
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notwithstanding, he advances the following intriguing conjecture in a
footnote:
I should also note that in contexts where S’s beliefs are inconsistent, I
doubt that any bridge principle (no matter how sophisticated) will serve
the [paraconsistent logician’s] purposes. Specifically, I suspect that the
[paraconsistent logician] faces a dilemma: any bridge principle will either
be false (while perhaps being strong enough to make their reductio
classically valid), or it will be too weak to make their reductio classically
valid (while perhaps being true). The naive bridge principle (3) stated
above falls under the first horn of this dilemma. More plausible bridge
principles will (I bet) not yield a valid reductio. (Fitelson 2008, p. 6 fn. 10)
In the following I propose to put Fitelson’s conjecture to the test. That
is, I propose to probe whether it is in fact true that any candidate
principle will fall foul of at least one of the aforementioned criteria:
it will either be philosophically untenable (violating Plausibility) or too
weak (violating Strength) to close the gap in the normative argument.11
3. On being inconsistent
For the normative argument to be at all plausible, it must be granted
that there are instances in which premiss 2 comes out true. It behooves
us, therefore, before we inquire into the prospects of finding a satis-
factory replacement for premiss 3, to say a few words about the para-
consistentist’s assumption that believers are inconsistent — let us refer
to this as the inconsistency assumption.
There are several familiar reasons for thinking that ordinary rea-
soners are inconsistent. An agent may have inconsistent beliefs with-
out being aware of it because she is inattentive or because discovering
the inconsistency in a vast network of dispositional and implicit beliefs
would simply be too difficult, perhaps even humanly impossible.
Moreover, not only individuals are prone to inconsistency.
Presumably examples of inconsistency also abound in belief sets
shared by groups or societies. For example, the statutes of a club, or
legal codes more generally, may harbour inconsistencies. (See Priest
1987, ch. 13.) Similarly, as we noted above, scientific theories may be
inconsistent.12 Paradoxes like the liar — whether or not one wishes to
11 MacFarlane (2004, p. 16) raises the very same question with respect to relevant logic.
12 Bohr’s atomic theory (which is inconsistent with Maxwell’s equations) is often men-
tioned as an example of a theory which, though generally recognized to be inconsistent, was
nevertheless heavily relied upon by researchers. It should be noted, however, that some
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treat them as dialetheia — may also be thought to be sources of dox-
astic inconsistency. Crucially for the paraconsistentist, in all of these
cases inconsistency need not trivialize the body of propositions in
question. Individuals or groups may decide to continue to embrace
an inconsistent statute or theory (at least provisionally) because it
turns out to be too difficult or costly to restore consistency. They
may also continue to engage in their practices because they are
simply unaware of the inconsistency of their ways.
All of these considerations rest on descriptive claims about the in-
consistency-proneness of ordinary reasoners: as a matter of fact agents
like us tend to have inconsistent beliefs or endorse inconsistent bodies
of propositions. As such they are empirical claims, in principle veri-
fiable by experimental psychology. And this is, of course, one way to
substantiate the paraconsistent logician’s assumption undergirding the
normative argument.
At least in some of the cases we described we would not be inclined
to consider the agents or groups in question to be rational, even
though the agent may not be blameworthy, as, for example, in the
case of inconsistencies that only an agent with superhuman cognitive
resources could detect. However, consider now the following stronger
claim: not only is the observation that agents typically have inconsist-
ent belief sets descriptively adequate, but there are circumstances in
which it is rational for agents to have inconsistent beliefs. In other
words, there are situations in which agents not only do but should
have inconsistent beliefs.
According to Harman (1986, p. 15), even upon recognizing her be-
liefs to be inconsistent, a rational agent may be within her rational
rights in failing to take measures to resolve the inconsistency (at least
in the short term), for instance, if the cost in terms of time, compu-
tational power, etc., of straightening out her belief set would simply be
prohibitive. Instead of attempting to restore consistency, the reason-
able thing for her to do might be simply to quarantine her inconsistent
beliefs, seeing to it that she does not exploit them in inference.
Examples of this type are characterized by their refusal to abstract
away from our limitations of time, focus, cognitive resources, and so
on. But it is often held that a certain amount of idealization is
philosophers will baulk at the idea that scientific theories are proper objects of belief. Some,
most notably constructive empiricists, maintain that our attitude towards the propositions that
constitute our scientific theories is one of acceptance rather than belief, where acceptance is a
cognitive mental state characterized by greater susceptibility to our voluntary control than
belief.
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necessary in laying down norms of rationality. Norms of rationality,
the thought goes, just are regulative ideals which, though they may be
unattainable for ordinary agents, nevertheless set the standard to
which we hold ourselves, and which we seek to approximate as
much as possible. The notion of rationality appealed to in the case
described by Harman, then, might not be taken to be a purely epi-
stemic one. Rather, it might be taken to represent a case in which
considerations of practical and/or prudential rationality illicitly en-
croach upon our standards of epistemic evaluation. A properly epi-
stemic notion of rationality demands that we abstract away from our
limitations, cognitive and otherwise.
Even so, there are arguably situations in which agents count as
epistemically rational in spite of holding inconsistent beliefs. The
thought is simple. A good epistemic agent seeks to have informative
true beliefs about the world. In order to further that aim, she must
collect and evaluate evidence. But clearly, even if her evidential situ-
ation is such that it strongly supports each of her beliefs individually,
the evidence may still be misleading in that the total set of propos-
itions believed is inconsistent. Scenarios such as these are dramatized
in the familiar lottery and preface paradoxes. Here we focus on a
version of the preface paradox.13 Let S be our agent and let P1, …, Pn
be a large, non-trivial set of her justified beliefs.14 Assuming that S is
an interesting inquirer, it is likely and eminently reasonable for her to
form the belief, Q, that she is mistaken about at least one of her
original beliefs. But now the belief set composed of all the Pi and Q
is inconsistent. For either at least one of the Pi is false or — if, mi-
raculously, all of them turn out to be true —Q is false. Pending fur-
ther evidence, the rational thing for S to do seems to be to tolerate the
inconsistency in her belief system. Indeed, this is presumably the pre-
dicament of any agent without the benefit of having worldly truths
directly revealed to her.15
13 Harman (1984, p. 109) hints at this ‘global’ version of the preface paradox.
14 ‘Non-trivial’ and ‘interesting’ simply serve to rule out silly ‘agents’ whose entire set of
beliefs consists of banal propositions such as ‘0 is a natural number’, ‘1 is a natural number’, ‘2
is a natural number’, … .
15 David Christensen (2004, ch. 3) makes a convincing case for the significance and inev-
itability of preface paradox scenarios. Incidentally, Fitelson himself rejects global norms of
consistency. Along with Kenny Easwaran (Easwaran and Fitelson 2015), he has developed a
weaker coherence norm for full belief on the basis of Joyce-style accuracy-dominance consid-
erations (Joyce 1998). Very roughly, a belief set is coherent if there is no alternative belief set
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However, even authors who are unswayed by preface paradox–like
considerations can hardly deny the weak descriptive version of the
inconsistency assumption — that there are ordinary agents who at
times harbour inconsistent belief sets. And this is all that is needed
to make the normative argument valid.16
4. Parameters and principles
Let us return to our central question, ‘Is there a bridge principle that
meets the requirements of Plausibility and of Strength that can suc-
cessfully take the place of premiss 3?’ Suppose the verdict is positive.
All that is required of us to establish this fact is that we produce a
bridge principle that fits the bill. Granted, there is the further difficulty
of settling the question of Plausibility (as opposed to mere minimal
plausibility), but let us set that problem to one side for now. But what
could possibly warrant a negative conclusion? In order to refute the
normative argument definitively, we would need to examine all pos-
sible bridge principles. But how could we possibly be confident that we
have exhaustively examined all eligible candidates? The problem is
that we have no clear conception of what is to count as an eligible
candidate bridge principle. It would seem that, short of an oracle that
provides us with an exhaustive list of bridge principles (along with a
certificate of its completeness), we can never justifiably arrive at a
negative conclusion. What to do?
In the absence of an oracle, I suggest we engage in good old-
fashioned conceptual analysis — an analysis of the very notion of a
bridge principle. We analyse bridge principles into their elementary
constituents or parameters. Once we have identified all of the param-
eters and explored all the various ways in which these can be varied —
all the possible ‘parameter settings’, as it were — we can map out the
logical space of possible bridge principles — all the possible ways
bridge principles can be generated on the basis of the initial stock of
parameters and the (discrete) range of parameter settings. In this way,
we arrive at a complete taxonomy of bridge principles (complete rela-
tive to the adequacy of our analysis), which we can then investigate in
a systematic fashion. Based on such an analysis, we can say that the
that outperforms it in terms of its lower measure of inaccuracy across all possible worlds, that
is, just in case it is not weakly dominated with respect to accuracy.
16 The stronger claim to the effect that it may be rational at times to hold inconsistent
belief sets will occupy us again in §§6 and 7.
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normative argument fails if a convincing case can be made that none of
the bridge principles that can be generated within the scheme (i.e.
none of the eligible candidates) are up to the job.
Thankfully, John MacFarlane (2004) has already done the bulk of
the taxonomic work. In the following, I will show how MacFarlane’s
classification of bridge principles (along with some extensions of my
own) can be used to make the evaluation of the normative argument
philosophically tractable. But first let me reconstruct the analysis of
bridge principles and the taxonomy it induces.
Let us begin by delineating the general shape — the blueprint, if you
like — of a bridge principle. A bridge principle is a material condi-
tional of the following form:17
If P1, P2, …, Pn  Q, then F ðP1,P2, …, Pn,QÞ
where the antecedent states a ‘fact’ about logical consequence and the
consequent takes the form of a normative claim featuring the agent’s
attitudes towards the propositions in question. Our premiss 3 can be
seen to fit this mould:
If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S ought to believe Q:
Moreover, it illustrates that the consequent itself often takes the form
of a material conditional (though not always — this, as we will see, is
one of the ways in which my taxonomy goes beyond MacFarlane’s). I
will often refer to the conditional in the consequent as the embedded
conditional (as opposed to the main conditional). So much for the
basic form of bridge principles. What now are the parameters, and
what is their range of variability? Well, normative claims require de-
ontic vocabulary.18 Following MacFarlane, I distinguish three deontic
operators: ought (o), may/permission (p) and (defeasible) reason (r).
And each of these operators can be given three distinct types of scope
with respect to the embedded conditional:
(C) Narrow scope with respect to the consequent: ðA  OðBÞÞ.
(W) Wide scope across the entire embedded conditional: OðA  BÞ.
17 I take the simplifying assumption that the conditionals in question be material condi-
tionals to be harmless in the present context, even from the paraconsistentist’s point of view.
No potentially objectionable features of the material conditional are exploited.
18 Unless, of course, the norm is expressed via the imperatival mood of the sentences by
means of which it is expressed. Such normative claims need not concern us here.
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(B) Binding both the antecedent and the consequent of the
embedded conditional: ðOðAÞ  OðBÞÞ.
(‘O’ here functions as a placeholder for deontic operators.)
Furthermore, we can distinguish two types of polarities for normative
claims: our claim could either be a positive obligation/permission/
reason to believe (+); or it could be a negative obligation/permis-
sion/reason not to disbelieve (–).19 Note that disbelieving is a mental
state ‘that stands in the same relation to believing as denying stands to
asserting’ (MacFarlane 2004, p. 8). Hence, ‘disbelieving’ is to be dis-
tinguished from ‘not believing’. There are many propositions I neither
believe nor disbelieve, either because I have not considered the prop-
osition in question or because, upon consideration, I choose to sus-
pend judgement about it. By contrast, if a proposition I have
considered is discredited by the evidence, disbelief is the prima facie
appropriate mental attitude. For simplicity, I will identify disbelieving
P with believing not-P, but nothing much hinges on this here.
To illustrate the workings of the framework, notice that premiss 3
corresponds to
Coþð Þ If P1, …, Pn  Q, then ifS believes all the Pi, S
ought to believe Q
Here ‘C’ designates the scope of the operator (that the operator is
given narrow scope with respect to the consequent); ‘o’ marks the type
of operator (ought); and ‘+’ tracks the polarity (that it is an ‘ought-to-
believe’ rather than an ‘ought-not-to-disbelieve’). In this way,
MacFarlane’s nomenclature (which I will adopt and extend) enables
us to designate bridge principles uniquely.
There is more. Some will find premiss 3, and indeed all of the bridge
principles that can be generated by means of the machinery intro-
duced thus far, to be excessively demanding. The antecedent of the
main (as opposed to the embedded) conditional states a fact about
logical consequence that is in no way sensitive to the agent’s logical
knowledge or her capacities for recognizing logical consequences of
her beliefs. (Co+), i.e. premiss 3, states that I ought to endorse the
19 As has often been noted, a problem with ‘ought’ in English is that it does not admit of
nominalization. ‘Obligation’ is an imperfect surrogate because not every true ought-claim
entrains a corresponding obligation. It may be, for instance, that I ought to get new shoes,
but I am under no obligation to do so. My talk of obligation, here and throughout, should
therefore be taken with a grain of salt.
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consequences of all of my beliefs, even when the complexity and/or
length of the shortest (non-trivial) deductive proof of these conse-
quences far surpasses my cognitive and temporal resources. In par-
ticular, I ought to believe each and every theorem of Peano arithmetic
provided I believe the axioms. On the principle that ought implies can,
and given that it would not be humanly possible literally to conform to
(Co+), some will push for the following weaker variant of premiss 3:
Co þ kð Þ If S knows that P1, …,Pn  Q, then if S
believes the Pi, S ought to believe Q:
Let us call this the epistemically constrained variant of (Co+) —
MacFarlane refers to such principles as the ‘k-variants’ of the corres-
ponding unconstrained principles.20 While the epistemically con-
strained principle avoids the potential objection of being excessively
demanding, it invites objections of its own. According to it, our ob-
ligations or permissions extend only as far as our logical knowledge.
But as MacFarlane points out, one might worry that this in fact creates
a disincentive to extend one’s logical knowledge; after all, the more
(logically) ignorant I am, the freer I am to believe as I please.
But this looks backwards. We seek logical knowledge so that we will know
how we ought to revise our beliefs: not just how we will be obligated to revise
them when we acquire this logical knowledge, but how we are obligated to
revise them even now, in our state of ignorance. (MacFarlane 2004, p. 12)
I will make no attempt to settle the question of whether epistemically
restricted or unrestricted bridge principles are ultimately to be pre-
ferred. For expositional simplicity, I will continue formulating all
bridge principles in their epistemically unconstrained form. But it is
important to note that nothing hinges on this; our discussion would
proceed in just the same way were we to consider k-variants of all the
principles we are investigating.21
20 The literature on epistemic closure principles knows a variety of different types of con-
straints: ‘If S is justified in believing that …’, ‘If S ought to know that …’, etc. Moreover, many
internalists take epistemic rationality to supervene on non-factive mental states. They would
consider only bridge principles whose antecedents are restricted to non-factive attitudes, that
is, typically, to the agent’s beliefs about what follows from what. I will pass over these issues
here.
21 In fact, a related question arises with respect to premisses 2 (the paraconsistent logician’s
inconsistency assumption) and 4. Premiss 4 affirms that there are propositions that S ought
not to believe in light of the inconsistency of her belief set. However, premiss 2 admits of both
an epistemically constrained and an epistemically unconstrained reading. On our formulation
of it, the normative argument rests on the epistemically unconstrained assumption that S has
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So much for our analysis of the bridge principles. However, before
we proceed further, a number of comments concerning the deontic
modals figuring in our bridge principles are in order. Our three de-
ontic operators — ought, may and reasons— express norms of theor-
etical rationality. Also, I will treat all deontic modals as propositional
operators. This is not uncontroversial. Peter Geach (1982) and, re-
cently, Mark Schroeder (2011) have argued that so-called deliberative
oughts— roughly, the kind of oughts that guide us in first-personal
deliberation — are best analysed, not as propositional operators, but
as relations between agents and actions.22 Nevertheless, I assume here
without further argument that the operator-reading can be made to
work. (For defences of this position see, for example, Broome 2000,
Broome 2013, and Wedgwood 2006.)
While ought and may are understood to be strict or ‘all-things-
considered’ notions, having reasons is a defeasible and pro tanto or
contributory notion. Having a reason to  is compatible with simul-
taneously having reasons not to  and even with it being the case that I
ought not to . Reasons, unlike oughts, may be weighed against each
other; the side that wins out determines what ought to be done. It may
be perfectly proper for me to have reasons to  and yet not to 
because my reasons are overridden, whereas if -ing is what I ought
to do and I fail to do so, I am, in Broome’s words, ‘not entirely as I
should be’.
Next, we must be clear what kind of ought is being invoked. I shall
assume that we are dealing with agential ‘practical’ or ‘deliberative
oughts’. Roughly, I take oughts of this sort to allocate responsibility
for an action to an agent (e.g. ‘Noa really ought to call her mother’).
‘Evaluative oughts’, by contrast, present a certain state of affairs as
generally desirable (e.g. ‘Pasta ought to be cooked al dente’) without
imputing responsibility to anyone in any obvious way.23 This assump-
tion too is not wholly uncontroversial. It might be thought that the
tension between the demands of epistemic (including logical) norms
and doxastic involuntarism is best finessed by treating doxastic oughts
(possibly unbeknownst to her) an inconsistent belief set. However, we might have opted for an
epistemically constrained version, whereupon premiss 2 concerns itself only with recognized
inconsistency. As we have seen in the foregoing section, agents plausibly find themselves in
both types of situation. Again, the normative argument can be run on the basis of both the
epistemically constrained and the epistemically unconstrained reading of premiss 2.
22 See (Schroeder 2011, §2.1) for a detailed characterization of deliberative or practical
oughts.
23 For the underlying distinction, see Sellars (1969) and Humberstone (1971).
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as evaluative oughts, or ‘ought-to-be’s in the Sellarsian phrase, and
hence not as can-implying oughts. Matthew Chrisman (2008) has re-
cently proposed an account of doxastic oughts along evaluative lines.
Richard Feldman’s approach (2000), which appeals to ‘role oughts’
falls into the same general category, but is criticized by Chrisman.
Chrisman’s approach has merit, but suffers, as he concedes, from
the lack of a clear connection between the rules of criticism that are
the ‘ought-to-be’s and the corresponding rules of conduct that are the
‘ought-to-do’s.
A further choice point is whether the oughts in question are ‘sub-
jective’ or ‘objective’ (the distinction straightforwardly carries over to
our remaining deontic concepts).24 The underlying thought is that an
agent’s conduct can be appraised from the standpoint of the informa-
tional state of the agent or from the standpoint of a superior or ideal
state of information. Imagine our friend George wandering through a
maze.25 We are perched on a tree above the maze overseeing the event.
From our privileged vantage point, we are able to say, ‘George has no
way of knowing it, but he ought to take a left there.’ The ought in
question is the objective ought. But we can also imagine a situation in
which we might employ a subjective ought. Suppose George has in-
formation (from an otherwise trustworthy source) about the layout of
the maze which, unbeknownst to him, is erroneous. We might then
find ourselves saying, ‘By George’s lights it makes most sense to turn
right there. So he ought to turn right.’
We are now in a position to see that there are natural pairings
between subjective deontic operators and epistemically constrained
readings of our bridge principles, on the one hand, and objective
deontic operators and epistemically unconstrained operators, on the
other. For instance, it makes sense to read the following epistemically
unconstrained version of (Co+),
If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the Pi, S ought to believe Q
24 I largely follow Wedgwood (forthcoming) here. But nothing much hinges on this par-
ticular account. All that matters is that our account is able to track the sensitivity of deontic
modals to the agent’s informational state (and possibly those of other agents advising or
evaluating her). How this sensitivity is accommodated in a semantic account of deontic
modals need not concern us. For instance, we might, for our purposes, opt equally well for
a contextualist or for a relativist treatment like those discussed by Kolodny and MacFarlane
(2010, p. 29).
25 The example is borrowed from Wedgwood (2012).
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as a claim, where the ought is to be understood in the objective sense.
By contrast,
If S recognizes that P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes the
Pi, S ought to believe Q
is a claim where ought receives a subjective reading that is sensitive to
the speaker’s informational context. Accordingly, let us call the first
type of bridge principle objective, the second type subjective. Most of
what follows is compatible with both types of bridge principles.
5. The Cs and Ps
So much by way of general comments about our bridge principles. Let
us turn to the possible replacements for premiss 3. We have already
seen that (Co+) will not do the trick. A moment’s reflection reveals
that the remaining members of the C-family with strict deontic oper-
ators fail, and fail for exactly the same reason: they are sufficiently
strong to support the argument, but violate minimal plausibility.
(Co+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S ought to believe Q.
(Co–) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S ought not to
disbelieve Q.
(Cp+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S may believe Q.
(Cp–) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S is permitted to not
disbelieve Q.
What goes wrong in each of these cases is that the combination of
narrow scope and strict operators makes the normative force of logic
implausibly demanding. According to these principles, the normative
force of logic is too strong relative to that of our non-logical doxastic
norms; for example, according to (Co+) I ought to believe Q because
it follows from my beliefs, no matter how good my reasons are for
disbelieving Q. A natural reaction in light of these failings is to retreat
to the weaker reasons operator, thus giving rise to
(Cr+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S has (defeasible) reason
to believe Q.
(Cr–) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S believes all the Pi, S has (defeasible) reason
not to disbelieve Q.
And this move does have some initial promise. Unlike its close cousins
the (Co)s and the (Cp)s, the (Cr)s appear to be immune against
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Harman’s objections. For simplicity, let us focus on (Cr+). My having
a defeasible reason for believing Q as a result of Q’s being entailed by
my antecedent beliefs is perfectly compatible with my simultaneously
having good, perhaps better, reasons for not believing Q (e.g. the
available evidence supports not-Q). This seems initially plausible:
my recognizing that a certain proposition Q is entailed by my beliefs
gives me (defeasible) reasons to believe Q, but these reasons can be
trumped by epistemic reasons for disbelieving Q.
What about Broome’s objection? Things are somewhat less straight-
forward here. Still, a case can arguably be made that (Cr+) can parry
Broome’s objection, provided one is willing to accept certain epis-
temological background assumptions. The epistemological accounts
germane to these assumptions are ones characterized by the fact
that they promote what we might call an innocent-until-proven-
guilty policy concerning belief maintenance. The idea behind such
approaches — Harman (2002, p. 10) has dubbed them general founda-
tions theories— is a kind of conservatism about belief: an agent’s belief
set enjoys a kind of default justification until she encounters suffi-
ciently strong countervailing evidence. On such views, then, it seems
proper to say, at first blush at least, that I do have reason to believe any
proposition I in fact believe. I have reason to stick to my beliefs unless
and until I am presented with sufficiently strong grounds for aban-
doning them. Of course, adopting (Cr+) might therefore mean tying
the fate of the normative argument to that of a general foundations
theory of belief maintenance, but perhaps that is a lot the paraconsis-
tent logician should embrace.
The crucial question now is whether (Cr+) also fulfils Strength.
That is, is (Cr+) strong enough to support the reductio? For the
reductio to succeed, premisses 1, 2, 4 and (Cr+) must form an incon-
sistent set, thereby laying the ground for rejecting EXP. It is here, it
turns out, that (Cr+) founders. (Since (Cr+) is the strongest of the
(Cr)s, the argument from insufficient strength will apply a fortiori to
the remaining (Cr)s.) In fact, the very reason that (Cr+) is able to
evade Harman’s and Broome’s objections is also the reason for its
demise, the fact, namely, that having an obligation not to believe P
(e.g. as dictated by certain doxastic norms) is compatible with having
pro tanto reasons for believing P on account of its being entailed by
one’s extant beliefs. In more detail: suppose S has inconsistent beliefs.
EXP and (Cr+) together imply that S has, for any proposition P,
defeasible reasons for believing P. But merely having defeasible reasons
for believing P is consistent with P being a proposition of the sort
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premiss 4 mandates us not to believe. (Cr+) can be superseded by the
epistemic norms that underlie premiss 4. Hence, (Cr+) is compatible
with 1, 2 and 4, and so fails to satisfy Strength.26
This is a strong blow against the (Cr)s. But the paraconsistentist
might try the following tack. It is true that (Cr+) does not support the
original normative argument. But we can easily tweak premiss 4 to
make it work. Simply replace premiss 4 with the following strength-
ened version:
40. Even if S’s set of beliefs is inconsistent and any proposition Q
whatsoever is entailed by it (courtesy of EXP), there are Qs such
that S has no reason to believe Q.
The combination of (Cr+) and 40 will indeed support the reductio. But
should we buy into 40, or does its extra strength also render it less
plausible? After all, why should there be propositions that I have no
reason to believe? Before addressing the question directly, we should
note that there is a scope ambiguity in the statement of 40 (and 4). Is 40
saying that there is some proposition P such that, for every agent S, S
has no reason to believe P? Not so. At least not if we focus on factual
propositions (as I will for present purposes). Arguably, there could be
agents in bizarre enough epistemic situations that could produce
deranged enough belief systems such that an agent with such a
belief system does have a (subjective) reason to believe that Mark
Spitz is the current president of the United States, as well as any
other inane proposition you might come up with. The more plausible
reading, therefore, is that for every agent S, there exists some propos-
ition P such that S has no reason to believe P. But even this reading
raises some doubt. For if (Cr+) is philosophically tenable, as the ad-
vocate of 40 maintains, then I do have a reason (albeit a defeasible one)
for believing any logical consequence of my beliefs. And so, saying that
I have no reason whatsoever to believe P given my background beliefs
and my evidence is to say that I could not possibly believe (not merely
that I do not have any reason to believe) any set of propositions that
entails P (otherwise, by (Cr+), I would have a reason to believe P). But
that seems implausibly strong.27
26 MacFarlane (2004, pp. 9–10) presents an interesting alternative argument to the effect
that anyone who adopts (Cr) must in fact be committed to a further principle, (Br), which he
deems problematic. While I will not discuss MacFarlane’s claim to the effect that (Br) is the
only plausible motivation one may have for adhering to (Cr), I will discuss the Bs in §5.
27 Notice that this is importantly different from the claim that for every agent there are
propositions such that if they are entailed by the agent’s beliefs, the agent has reason to revise
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I think this is a major strike against such attempts at salvaging the
(Cr)s. More importantly, though, even if the normative argument
could be modified so as to restore its validity by means that do not
undermine the tenability of its premisses, the paraconsistentist would
still have to vindicate (Cr+). Saying that (Cr+) is minimally plausible
is one thing; saying that it satisfies Plausibility is quite another. I
submit that (Cr+) is indefensibly weak, and therefore not philosoph-
ically tenable. To see this, consider again the ‘Harman scenario’: I
believe P  Q and P. (Cr+) gives me a reason to believe Q. But sup-
pose I have decisive reasons for disbelieving Q. In that case, my
logic-induced reason for believing Q will be trumped by my epistemic
reasons for disbelieving Q. In a way, that is as it should be, as we have
seen: it avoids Harman’s objection. However, according to (Cr+), that
is all that logic requires of me. So long as I am appropriately sensitive
to the reasons for believing Q stemming from its being entailed by my
antecedent beliefs, I have discharged my logical duties. In particular,
(Cr+) in no way requires of me that I should revise my beliefs in light
of their consequences. Surely, though, logical coherence does demand
that I modify my belief set so as to avoid blatant inconsistencies. True,
we have seen that there may be reasons for thinking that there are
cases of rational doxastic inconsistency. However, the adoption of
(Cr+) would license pandemic inconsistencies that go well beyond
such rarefied cases of ‘reasonable inconsistency ’. The solution, there-
fore, cannot lie with the (Cr)s (at least not taken on their own).
So far, then, Fitelson’s conjecture has held up. But then again, none
of the bridge principles considered up to this point — with the excep-
tion, perhaps, of the (Cr)s — held any philosophical promise. At this
stage I want to consider a further family of bridge principles, not
treated in MacFarlane (2004), which deserve our consideration. The
key idea is that the embedded conditional in the bridge principles we
have been considering should be replaced by a primitive, indecom-
posable, dyadic conditional deontic operator. In the case of ought, this
amounts to ‘OughtSðQjPÞ’, read as ‘S ought to Q conditional on P’,28
which is true just in case Q holds at all the most ideal worlds at which
P is true. Conditional operators of this type have been proposed to
deal with well-known paradoxes in deontic logic arising from
her initial beliefs. (Cr+), being a narrow-scope principle, makes no provision for belief
revisions.
28 I will henceforth suppress the index.
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‘contrary-to-duty obligations’ (for example, if I kill my neighbour, I
ought to do it humanely).29
On the basis of such operators we can create a novel family of
principles (call it ‘P’ for ‘primitive’):
(Po+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then Ought (S believes QjS believes the PiÞ.
(Pp+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then May (S believes QjS believes the PiÞ.
(Pr+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then Reasons (S believes QjS believes the PiÞ.30
The trouble with conditional operators from our perspective is that
they fail to satisfy Strength, on account of the fact that the ‘conse-
quent’ in our conditional operators — the operator-involving
claim — does not detach. In other words, the pattern of inference
(1) S ought to Q conditional on P
(2) P
(3) Therefore, S ought to Q
is invalid.31 (If it were valid, our dyadic operators would simply reduce
to the Cs, and so would be inadequate in dealing with the aforemen-
tioned paradoxes.) However, the conclusion of the argument would
need to detach in order for us to be able to generate the desired contra-
diction. Accordingly, the Ps do not generate a contradiction with 4, and
therefore turn out to be too weak to support the normative argument.
This type of weakness equally afflicts the Ws, as we will see.32
6. The Ws
In the face of the inadequacies of strict narrow-scope bridge principles
and of dyadic conditional operators, the choice one is presented with
is either to opt for a slack reasons operator or to become a ‘wide-
scoper’. Offered this choice, many authors have plumped for the latter
option.33 And indeed, in the light of our discussion of the (Cr)s, this
29 See von Wright (1956).
30 It is not hard to imagine the corresponding negative variants.
31 For simplicity I focus on the case of ought. The cases of the other two operators are
analogous.
32 For further objections against dyadic conditional deontic operators, see Kolodny and
MacFarlane (2010).
33 The question arises, not only in the case of logical coherence norms, but also for other
principles of theoretical and practical rationality (for instance, that one ought to bring about
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may seem to be the paraconsistent logician’s best bet. In the present
context this amounts to espousing a member of what we might dub
the ‘W-family ’. Its distinctive feature, recall, is that the deontic oper-
ators are given wide scope over the embedded conditional: OðA  BÞ.
We arrive at the following three wide-scope principles and their nega-
tive counterparts:
(Wo+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then S ought to see to it that (if S believes all the
Pi, S believes Q).
(Wp+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then S may see to it that (if S believes all the Pi, S
believes Q).
(Wr+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then S has reason to see to it that (if S believes all
the Pi, S believes Q).
To facilitate the exposition I will focus on (Wo+). Everything I say in
the discussion to follow carries over straightforwardly to the remain-
ing Ws.34
(Wo+) has considerable intuitive upside. It elegantly dodges both of
our criteria for minimal plausibility: neither Harman’s objection nor
Broome’s point get any purchase on (Wo+). As for the former, the
wide-scope reading provides just the wiggle room needed to neutralize
Harman’s objection. Suppose I believe P and P  Q. According to
(Wo+), I am given the choice of either retaining my beliefs and also
coming to believe Q or ditching at least one of my antecedent beliefs in
P and P  Q so as to absolve me from the obligation to believe Q.
Should Q turn out to be untenable, the latter course of action recom-
mends itself: we revise our beliefs in the light of their unpalatable
consequences. This not only meets Harman’s challenge but also
seems to get the normative link between logic and reasoning exactly
right: our processes of belief maintenance are constrained by facts
about what follows from what, but they are not so narrowly con-
strained as to reduce us to mere theorem provers. We do not and
should not merely churn out and endorse every last consequence of
some initial belief set. Put another way, we should not look to logic to
tell us what to believe. Rather, reasoning consists in negotiating global
the means deemed necessary to promote one’s ends, that if one ought to  one ought to
intend to , and so on). See Way (2010) for a survey and further references.
34 We may note immediately, though, that the (Wp)s are out of contention. The (Wp)s
imply that I have permission to see to it that if I believe P and Q, I also believe P ^ Q, but this
does not even so much as provide me with a reason to believe the latter when I believe the
former. As MacFarlane puts it, ‘the difference between the (Wp)s and the position that there
are no logical norms for belief seems slim indeed’ (2004, p. 10).
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logical demands of coherence with local epistemic norms that guide us
in our doxastic deliberation. This element of negotiation is well cap-
tured by the wide-scope reading.
Moreover, (Wo+) is untroubled by Broome’s reflexivity worries.
The flaw with the ought- and may-based principles considered so far
was that because P entails itself, the agent incurs an obligation (or
permission) to believe P for any (perhaps unfounded) belief P she
happens to be saddled with at a given point in time. (Wo+) imposes
no such bogus obligations. The fact that I happen to believe P and that
P  P only entails an obligation to believe P if I believe P, which is no
obligation at all. It is because of these features that the Ws enjoy
considerable popularity.35
The question now is whether the prima facie attractive Ws are a
good fit for the paraconsistentist. But here we immediately face a
difficulty. We have seen that the normative argument is premised
on what we called the inconsistency assumption — the assumption
that reasoners do at times (perhaps even should at times) hold incon-
sistent beliefs. It is because (even rational) agents are likely to find
themselves with logically incoherent beliefs and because logic ought to
be normative for reasoning that the paraconsistent logician contends
we should reject EXP. But now take an agent S who harbours an
inconsistent belief set F, and suppose we accept EXP. (Wo+) requires
S to do one of two things: it requires of S either that she renege on her
belief in some of the F so as to restore consistency or, if she retains her
beliefs in all of the members of F, that she must believe all of F ’s
consequences, i.e. any Q whatsoever. But this seems to show that
(Wo+) is consistent with the normative argument’s remaining pre-
misses. This will always be so if one regards it to be a correct blanket
policy always to avoid inconsistency. In other words, facing the choice
between abandoning some of her present beliefs to avoid inconsist-
ency and having to endorse any proposition whatever, the agent ought
always to avoid inconsistency by revising her beliefs. On this
(staunchly objective) reading of epistemic oughts, the Ws would not
produce the necessary contradiction with premiss 4 (in the presence of
EXP), and so the naive argument would not go through.
However, I do not think the paraconsistentist should be overly
troubled by this. So long as one is willing to grant that there are
circumstances (such as preface paradox–type scenarios) in which
35 MacFarlane himself falls into this category of advocates, as do Field (2009), Restall (2005)
and Sainsbury (2002).
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agents not only have but ought to have inconsistent belief sets, for the
reasons mentioned in §2, we thereby grant that there are circum-
stances in which (Wo+) would enjoin us not to take consistency-
restoring measures, but rather to stick to our inconsistent belief set
and hence to incur a commitment to believing all of its conse-
quences — and in the presence of EXP, this amounts to a commitment
to believing any proposition whatsoever.
A version of the preface paradox will illustrate the point. Suppose I
author a meticulously researched non-fiction book on cuttlefish. My
book is composed of a large set of non-trivial propositions P1, …, Pn
about the extraordinary physiology and ethology of cuttlefish. Seeing
that all of my claims are the product of scrupulous research, I have
every reason firmly to believe each of the Pi individually. But I also
have overwhelming inductive evidence for Q: that at least one of my
beliefs is in error. The Pi and Q cannot be jointly true. How ought I
react to the inconsistency in my belief set? Surely I cannot simply ditch
some of the Pi willy-nilly to ensure consistency.
36 It would be irra-
tional for me to abandon any particular proposition in the absence of
any specific countervailing evidence. And it would be mad, of course,
to ditch the whole lot of my beliefs. Indeed, as MacFarlane (2004,
p. 15) rightly emphasizes, even if, irresponsibly, I wanted to sacrifice
some or all of the claims in my book, unless one maintains a wildly
far-fetched form of belief voluntarism, it is not something I can simply
decide to do. Hence, consistency-restoring belief revision is not an
option in the situation described (in the absence of further relevant
evidence). The upshot of this, we said, is that (Wo+) requires of S that
she believe all the consequences of her beliefs whenever she has good
reason to hold inconsistent beliefs.
Have we thereby rehabilitated (Wo+) as a candidate bridge prin-
ciple? For this to be the case it would have to meet both Plausibility
and Strength. Despite its initial attraction, much more would have to
be said about the philosophical viability of the Ws.37 But even if
we grant for the time being that a good case can be made for them,
36 Acting in this way would carry the considerable risk of what Niko Kolodny calls sat-
isfying a coherence requirement ‘against reason’ (Kolodny 2007). The idea is this. An agent
with an inconsistent belief set can reimpose consistency in a variety of ways that are not
sensitive to the evidence she is presented with. Suppose I have good epistemic reasons for
believing P and that I also happen to believe not-P on rather flimsy grounds. As far as the
consistency requirement is concerned it does not matter which of the two beliefs I abandon.
Yet it is clear that given my evidential situation I should ditch not-P.
37 See MacFarlane’s helpful discussion (2004, pp. 11–14).
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I believe the Ws are not an option for the paraconsistentist. This is
because the Ws still fail to satisfy Strength. This seems surprising. After
all, as we have seen, in the presence of EXP S ought to believe any
proposition whatsoever in scenarios in which S rationally holds in-
consistent beliefs. And this seems to be exactly the type of absurd
consequence the paraconsistent logician needs in order to get the
normative argument off the ground. But this is a mistake. What is
needed for the reductio to go through is an explicit deontic claim to the
effect that S ought to or may believe an absurd or implausible prop-
osition, thereby contradicting premiss 4. However (Wo+) yields no
such claim. In fact (Wo+) is consistent with premisses 1, 2 and 4 even in
cases in which consistency-restoring belief revision is out of the ques-
tion. The reason is that the principle merely requires the agent to see
to it that the conditional in the scope of the ought-operator is true.
However, even in cases in which the antecedent inconsistent belief set
is retained, no ought-claim can be detached. Indeed their non-detach-
ing nature is one of the characteristic features of wide-scope principles
(see Broome 2003). In other words, from ‘S ought to (believe Q if S
believes F)’ (where F is an instance of a rationally held inconsistent
belief set and Q an untenable proposition which S ought not to be-
lieve, according to premiss 4, but which obviously follows from F via
EXP) and ‘S believes F’ it follows that ‘S believes Q’ (provided that S
complies with (Wo+)), but it does not follow that ‘S ought to believe
Q’. But it is this latter, explicitly normative, consequence that the
paraconsistentist needs to generate a contradiction with premiss 4
so as to make the reductio work. To be sure, in the circumstances
described S will hold any number of beliefs which, according to prem-
iss 4, she ought not to hold, and for this she may be liable to epistemic
criticism, but this is not enough to render premisses 1, 2, (Wo+) and 4
inconsistent. It follows that even if we take into account scenarios in
which inconsistency is inevitable, (Wo+) is too weak. Seeing that
(Wo–) and the (Wr)s are strictly weaker than (Wo+), they suffer
the same fate.
Is there a comeback for the paraconsistentist? Well, one might try to
argue for an additional principle that would enable us to detach deontic
consequences from (Wo+), thus closing the gap in the normative ar-
gument. Either one of the following two principles would do the trick:
(A) OðA  BÞ  ðA  OðBÞÞ
(B) OðA  BÞ  ðOðAÞ  OðBÞÞ
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What can we say about them? (A) can immediately be seen to be un-
acceptable. In its presence the Ws would straightforwardly collapse into
the Cs, which we have already discarded. (B) is of course just a version
of the principle K that characterizes normal modal logics (modal logics
admitting of a Kripke semantics). However, K, it seems fair to say, is
rejected by most deontic logicians.38 But even if the paraconsistentist
were willing to bite the bullet on (B), adding it to the mix in effect
amounts to endorsing a new, distinct family of bridge principles: the Bs.
And it is to the Bs that we must turn in the next section.
7. The Bs
So far, then, Fitelson’s conjecture appears to be right on the money:
the prima facie most plausible bridge principles have revealed them-
selves to be too weak to support the normative argument’s paracon-
sistent conclusions, while the sufficiently strong bridge principles do
not stand up to scrutiny. But let us not jump to conclusions; we have
yet to examine the Bs — the class of bridge principles whose charac-
teristic feature is that the deontic operator occurs both in the ante-
cedent and in the consequent of the embedded conditional. By varying
the deontic operator, we can once again generate three principles
along with their negative variants:39
(Bo+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S ought to believe all the Pi, S ought to
believe Q.
(Bp+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S may believe all the Pi, S may believe Q.
(Br+) If P1, …, Pn  Q, then if S has reason to believe all the Pi, S has
reason to believe Q.
Are the Bs any better suited for the job at hand? Whether this is so
depends on the norms underwriting the doxastic obligations and
38 For reasons largely already provided by Chisholm (1963).
39 We could further extend MacFarlane’s classificatory scheme by allowing for ‘mixed’ Bs
in which the deontic operators featuring in the antecedent and in the consequent of the
embedded conditional could be distinct. For example, in addition to (Bo+), we could consider
also
(Bop+): If P1, …,Pn  Q, then if S ought to believe all the Pi, S may believe Q.
(Bor+): If P1, …,Pn  Q, then if S ought to believe all the Pi, S has reason to believe Q.
and so on for all the possible combinations. However, it turns out that for present purposes
there is no need to distinguish these additional cases.
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permissions in question. Let me explain. The Bs really incorporate
references to two distinct kinds of norms.40 The oughts in the ante-
cedents and those in the consequents of the embedded conditionals
seem to stem from different normative sources. In the embedded
conditional ‘if S ought to believe all the Pi, S ought to believe Q’,
the ought in the antecedent refers to whatever doxastic norms (evi-
dential norms, perhaps) make it the case that S ought to believe the Pi
(for simplicity we may assume that the Pi are not themselves acquired
by logical inference, and so the norms in question will not themselves
be logical or logic-induced). The obligation to believe Q, by contrast,
appears to stem from the normative force (if any) induced by logical
consequence, along with that inherited from the doxastic norms that
oblige us to believe the Pi. S ought to believe Q on the strength of it
being the case that she ought to believe the Pi and it being the case that
Q is logically entailed by the Pi; the positive epistemic status of S’s
beliefs in the Pi are propagated to their logical consequences.
What non-logical doxastic norm might underwrite the ought in the
antecedent? Perhaps the most obvious contender for the non-logical
doxastic norm in question is the truth norm (TN):41
(TN) For all S, for all P, if S considers or ought to consider P, (S ought to
believe P) if and only if P is true.
However, a moment’s reflection reveals that the (TN)-based approach,
like the blanket policy of inconsistency avoidance we discussed in the
previous section, is not an option for the paraconsistent logician. The
reason is that (TN) does not countenance scenarios in which an agent
ought to believe an inconsistent set of propositions. But it is precisely
this property that any doxastic norm underwriting (Bo+) would have
to enjoy for (Bo+) to be a genuine contender. This, in turn, is because
for (Bo+) to satisfy Strength, the consequent of the embedded condi-
tional (‘S ought to believe Q’ for some unacceptable Q) would have to
be detachable in some cases so as to generate an inconsistency with
premiss 4. There would thus have to be instances in which the ante-
cedent of the embedded conditional (‘S ought to believe all the Pi’) is
true even when the set of Pi is inconsistent. Clearly, though, on the
(TN)-based interpretation of the antecedent this is impossible — it is
never the case that an agent ought to believe an inconsistent set of
40 For expositional convenience, my discussion will focus on (Bo+). But everything I say
carries over mutatis mutandis to the remaining Bs, unless explicitly noted otherwise.
41 Anything I go on to say about the truth norm applies equally to Timothy Williamson–
style knowledge norms (Williamson 2000).
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propositions, because by definition at least one of the propositions in
an inconsistent set cannot be true. It follows that the agent must be
flouting (TN) with respect to at least one of the Pi. In other words,
(TN) entails the norm of logical consistency.42
A general lesson emerges from these considerations: due to the
structure of (Bo+), where ought acts also on the antecedent of the
embedded conditional, the simple inconsistency assumption is not
enough. Not only must agents occasionally hold inconsistent belief
sets, to satisfy the antecedent it must be possible to do so rationally.
What is needed, therefore, is a doxastic norm to underwrite the ought
in the antecedent that tolerates (indeed, in the case of the (Bo)s,
sometimes mandates) inconsistent belief sets. Only then can the ante-
cedent of the embedded conditional ever be satisfied and so the con-
sequent detached. To see this, suppose that the doxastic norm S is
subject to is inconsistency-mandating and that they can be made out
to be plausible. The paraconsistent logician’s argument can then be
seen to go through as follows. Let F be an inconsistent belief set that S
ought to believe according to the doxastic norm in question.
(a) F  Q for some absurd proposition Q (by premiss 1, i.e. by
the supposed validity of EXP).
(b) If S ought to believe each member of F, then S ought to
believe Q (by modus ponens from (Bo+) and (a)).
(c) S ought to believe Q (by modus ponens from 2 and the as-
sumption that S ought to believe each member of F ).
(d) S ought not believe Q (from premiss 3 and the fact that Q is
absurd).
(e) Contradiction (from (c) and (d)).
Notice that if, contrary to our assumption, we were to enforce a policy
of strict consistency with respect to belief systems (which (TN) en-
tails), the step from (b) to (c) (and hence the argument as a whole) no
longer goes through.
It follows from this that (Bo+) satisfies Strength just in case the
paraconsistentist can make it plausible that there is a doxastic norm
42 There may be other reasons for dismissing (TN). Some of them are quite general (see
Bykvist and Hattiangadi 2007 and Glu¨er and Wikforss 2009 for two recent criticisms). Others
may pertain only to particular brands of paraconsistentists (for instance, dialetheists presum-
ably cannot accept (TN)).
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that underpins the ought in the antecedent and which is such that it
mandates inconsistent belief sets at least under certain circumstances.
But is there a plausible norm that fits this description?
We saw that the prototypical cases in which an agent may be said to
rationally hold inconsistent beliefs are ones in which the agent is
highly confident in each member of a set of propositions taken indi-
vidually but where those propositions cannot be jointly true. Since
high confidence does not guarantee truth, an alethic norm like (TN) is
ill-suited for the job. What the paraconsistentist is after, rather, is a
sub-truth norm: a norm that allows an agent to form beliefs on less
than conclusive grounds. Consequently, an evidential norm appears to
be the most natural non-alethic substitute for (TN). That is, instead of
requiring that an agent ought to believe a proposition just in case it is
true, the paraconsistent logician might try something along the lines of
‘S ought to believe P just in case the evidence available to S makes it
sufficiently likely that P’, where the ‘sufficiently-likely threshold’ will
be determined by contextual factors (such as what is at stake in the
deliberative situation at hand). The question, then, is ‘Can the para-
consistent logician, equipped with a suitable sub-truth norm, make a
case for a version of the Bs?’
I believe there is a principled reason for doubting that there can be
any such norm. The trouble is that any sub-truth norm that does
what the paraconsistentist needs it to do is bound to be incompatible
with (Bo+). Now, it is important to be clear about the kind of in-
compatibility I am after here. Suppose N is a sub-truth norm and let
F be an N-tolerated (or mandated) inconsistent set of propositions
believed by S. In the presence of EXP, F entails P for some patently
absurd, premiss 4-violating proposition P. But if N is a sensible dox-
astic norm, as we are assuming, it should tell against P. In other
words, according to N, S ought not to believe P. But given that P
follows from a set all of whose members S ought to believe according
to N, S also ought to believe P by (Bo+). This is just the kind of
incompatibility that is needed for the normative argument against
explosion to go through. It is not the kind of incompatibility I have in
mind.
Rather, the tension I wish to highlight stems from the fact that the
paraconsistent logician’s desired sub-truth norm is likely not to be
closed under conjunction. That is, the norm might prescribe belief in
each of a number of propositions, while disallowing belief in the con-
junction of all these propositions. The idea is perhaps best illustrated
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by the following familiar example. Suppose the paraconsistent logician
goes in for the evidential norm of belief mentioned above:
(EN) For all S, for all propositions P: if S considers or ought to consider P,
S ought to believe P if and only if P is sufficiently likely in light of S’s
evidence.
(EN) is a sub-truth norm that presumably does have the desired
property of countenancing instances of rationally held inconsistent
belief sets: a set of propositions may be such that each of its members
individually exceeds the appropriate likelihood threshold and so satis-
fies (EN), and yet it may be impossible for all of the propositions
contained in the set to be true together. (EN) may give rise to such
cases because, unlike the truth norm, it allows for a certain margin for
error: it may be that I ought to believe a proposition in a given epi-
stemic situation, even though there is a chance that my evidence is
misleading me and so that my belief is false. The trouble now, how-
ever, is that errors add up. If we consider a sufficiently large number of
interesting propositions, the likelihood of all of the propositions being
jointly true will dip below the threshold. Therefore, sub-truth norms
like (EN) will typically have the consequence that it is not the case that
one ought to believe the conjunction of such a large set of propos-
itions. Indeed, given certain reasonable assumptions, they will prompt
us to disbelieve the conjunction of such a large number of
propositions.
Again, this is just the lesson of the epistemic paradoxes. It can be
seen most clearly if we spell out (EN)’s sufficient likelihood condition
in probabilistic terms — in terms of subjective probabilities, say.43
Given a threshold expressed in the form of a real number t in the
unit interval, we can easily conceive of scenarios in which each
member of a set of propositions fP1, …, Png exceeds the threshold
(PrðPiÞ4 t , where 1  i  n), but where the conjunction of the prop-
ositions in question fails to do so (PrðP1 ^ … ^ PnÞ  t).
Where is the problem? Well, we have observed that there will be
cases where, according to (EN), S ought to believe each of the Pi, but
where (according to the very same norm) it is not the case that S
ought to believe their conjunction. The problem, now, resides in the
fact that (Bo+) dictates that S ought to believe all of the logical con-
sequences of the Pi, including the conjunction of the Pi. Thus (EN)
43 I invoke subjective probabilities only for the sake of concreteness; the familiar point I am
making can be made with respect to any probability function, regardless of how we choose to
interpret it.
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and (Bo+) are incompatible! Jointly they entail that it is and is not the
case that S ought to believe P1 ^ … ^ Pn. Crucially, though, the con-
flict between these two norms cannot be chalked up to the presence of
EXP. Therefore this tension between (EN) and (Bo+), unlike the one
discussed above, undermines the paraconsistent logician’s case.
Moreover, the phenomenon we encounter here is not merely an
artefact of (EN) or our probabilistic elaboration of it. Rather, it seems
plausible that any sub-truth norm will be afflicted by similar problems
when paired with (Bo+). This is so by virtue of the fact that any such
norm, if it is to support the normative argument against explosion,
must jointly satisfy two seemingly irreconcilable conditions: it must (i)
mandate (or at least tolerate) inconsistent belief sets, and (ii) tolerate
closure under (at least known) entailment. However, as we have
observed, a doxastic norm like (TN) that complies with (ii) is
bound to flout (i); and conversely, a norm like (EN) that allows for
inconsistent belief sets (and so respects (i) will flout (ii). The reason
why sub-truth norms violate (ii), we have said, is because they tolerate
a certain margin of error. On the principle that error accumulates, any
such norm should deem conjunctions of non-trivial propositions to
be less likely (and hence less worthy of belief ) in proportion to the
number of propositions conjoined. Indeed, supposing, as seems rea-
sonable, that a workable sub-truth norm requires that propositions
that are sufficiently unlikely ought to be disbelieved, it turns out that
such sub-truth norms are incompatible with any of the bridge prin-
ciples in the B-family that involve strict deontic operators (including
those with negative polarity), not merely (Bo+).
In light of the foregoing considerations, the paraconsistentist is thus
faced with the following decision. Either she can retreat to one of the
(Br)s,44 or she can point to a way of understanding our sub-truth
norms which does satisfy (ii) after all, and so does not clash with
(Bo+) (or the other B-type bridge principles involving strict deontic
operators).
However, neither of these options holds much promise. Begin with
the former. It is true that a weaker (Br)-type bridge principle is com-
patible with (EN) and sub-truth norms like it: according to the (Br)s,
S has a reason to believe P1 ^ … ^ Pn whenever her beliefs in the Pi
taken individually satisfy the operative non-logical doxastic norm, but
as we know, S’s having a reason to believe P1 ^ … ^ Pn may be
44 I mean here to include also the ‘mixed’ B-type principles mentioned in fn. 39, the (Bor)s
and the (Bpr)s.
Mind, Vol. 0 . 0 . 2016  Steinberger 2016
Explosion and the Normativity of Logic 31
 by guest on M
arch 19, 2016
http://m
ind.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
trumped by a weightier reason, namely the reason, stemming from the
said doxastic norm, that P1 ^ … ^ Pn is highly unlikely to be true. The
problem with this, however, is that the (Br)s are subject to the very
same objections that already disqualified their narrow-scope cousins,
the (Cr)s (see §5 above). Like them, the (Br)s violate both Strength
and Plausibility (if not minimal plausibility).
This leaves the paraconsistentist with the second option, that of pro-
posing a sub-truth norm that can be understood so as to meet condi-
tions (i) and (ii). We have seen that if there is such a proposal it must
reject the principle that error accumulates so as to decrease the likeli-
hood of large conjunctions. Does a norm like (EN) remain intelligible
when this extra principle is abandoned? One way of doing so would be
to adopt John Pollock’s view to the effect that any argument is only ‘as
good as its weakest link’ (1983, p. 248). On this view, even a conjunction
composed of a very large number of propositions would be no less likely,
and hence according to (EN) no less worthy of belief, than the least likely
of its conjuncts. I believe that Christensen (2004, §4.3) successfully dem-
onstrates the ‘weakest link principle’ to be untenable. I am willing to
concede, however, that, for all I have said, there may be alternative
principles that the paraconsistentist could avail herself of. But the
onus is on the paraconsistent logician to present such a principle.
8. Conclusion
Fitelson’s dilemma has proved to be real. Our investigation demon-
strates that the normative argument is in serious trouble. Vindicating
the argument would require either casting reasonable doubt on our
analysis of bridge principles or exploiting a loophole we have missed.
It is also worth noting that our discussion is perfectly compatible with
all-out Harmanesque scepticism about the normativity of logic.
Importantly, though, it does not presuppose it. One can maintain
that logic is normative for thinking, while denying that this assump-
tion furthers the paraconsistentist’s case. Indeed, we have encountered
a range of bridge principles that are prima facie attractive and yet
incapable of supporting the normative argument against EXP because
they fail to meet Strength.45
45 I am grateful to Arif Ahmed, Mic Detlefsen, Jesper Kallestrup, Peter Milne, Graham
Priest, Jeff Speaks, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Fritz Warfield, as well as to audiences at the
universities of St Andrews, Notre Dame, Aarhus, Edinburgh and Cambridge for helpful dis-
cussions. Special thanks are due to Yoon Choi, Mara-Daria Cojocaru, Branden Fitelson,
Hannes Leitgeb, John MacFarlane, Julien Murzi and Diego Tajer for commenting on earlier
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